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A “FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR” REMOVAL 
PROCEEDING: DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN CONTRERAS v. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL 
Hayley Trahan-Liptak* 
Abstract: On January 4, 2012, in Contreras v. Attorney General of the United 
States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Fifth 
Amendment due process right to effective assistance of counsel does not 
apply to immigration filings prior to removal proceedings. The court rea-
soned that this is the case even if counsel’s mistakes jeopardize a subse-
quent removal preceding. In so holding, the court failed to recognize that 
the fundamental fairness of a removal hearing may be based on years of 
process and that pre-proceeding asylum applications are inextricably 
linked with removal procedures themselves. This decision leaves immi-
grants without a remedy when their attorneys make mistakes that nega-
tively affect their removal proceedings. 
Introduction 
 In January 2008, immigration attorney Tahir Mella met with Mar-
garito Contreras to discuss Margarito’s recently denied petition for em-
ployment-based permanent residency in the United States on behalf of 
him and his wife, Norma.1 Although Mella knew, or should have 
known, that the deadline to file an appeal had long passed, he re-
quested one thousand dollars from the immigrant family to file an un-
timely motion to reconsider the visa petition.2 Mella did not advise the 
Contrerases of other options.3 When immigration officials rejected the 
motion, Mella’s office again represented the Contrerases at their de-
portation proceedings for an additional fee of fifty-five hundred dol-
lars.4 Instead of appearing himself, Mella sent an inexperienced immi-
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). 
1 See Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 581, 582 (3d Cir. 2012). 
2 Id. at 582, 586. 
3 In re Contreras, No. A088 194 669, 2010 WL 4213253, at *1 (B.I.A. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2012). 
4 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 582. 
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gration attorney who misrepresented the facts of the Contrerases’ ap-
peal of their denied visa petition.5 Moreover, the attorney requested 
that the court rule for voluntary departure, a request the Immigration 
Judge (IJ) thought would “shock[] and confuse[]” the Contrerases.6 At 
the final hearing in April 2008, yet another attorney from Mella’s firm 
requested voluntary departure, which the court granted.7 
 On August 18, 2008, the Contrerases filed a motion to reopen 
their case on the basis of prior ineffective assistance of counsel.8 The IJ 
denied the motion and the Contrerases appealed to the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA).9 The BIA agreed with the IJ, finding that the 
Contrerases had (1) failed to demonstrate that the immigration hear-
ing itself was unfair, and (2) failed to show that counsel’s actions during 
the removal proceedings had prevented them from reasonably present-
ing a case.10 
 On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the denial of the Contrerases’ 
motion to reopen the case.11 The court held that although ineffective 
assistance of counsel during removal proceedings is recognized under 
the Fifth Amendment as a violation of due process, counsel’s mistakes 
must be so severe that the fundamental fairness of the proceedings is 
violated.12 Though the court agreed that absent Mella’s mistakes the 
proceeding might have resulted differently, the court found no preju-
dice at the hearing itself.13 Instead, the Third Circuit held that due 
process for immigration proceedings ensures only a fundamentally fair 
hearing and does not apply to pre-proceeding immigration petitions.14 
 By finding that the Contrerases’ hearing was fair despite Mella’s 
“inept conduct,” the court failed to recognize that the fundamental 
fairness of a removal hearing may be based on years of process starting 
well before removal proceedings begin.15 Because pre-proceeding ap-
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.; In re Contreras, 2010 WL 4213253, at *1. 
9 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 582–83. 
10 In re Contreras, 2010 WL 4213253, at *2. 
11 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 581. 
12 U.S. Const. amend. V; Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584, 586. 
13 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585–86. 
14 See id. at 580–81. 
15 See id. at 580–81, 585–86. The court admitted that “attorney incompetence” can 
make the complex immigration system “insurmountable,” but held that “because counsel’s 
substandard performance occurred before the removal proceedings,” there was no rem-
edy. Id. at 587. During a removal hearing, aliens may instead rely on pre-proceeding appli-
cations, including previously filed applications for visas, labor certifications, and asylum 
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plications are inextricably linked with removal measures, the court’s 
refusal to apply due process protections to pre-proceeding mistakes 
narrows due process for immigrants.16 
I. The Contrerases’ Denied Visa Petition, Voluntary  
Removal, and Appeal 
 Margarito Contreras and his wife Norma Contreras entered the 
United States from Mexico in 1993 and 1998, respectively.17 In 2000, 
Margarito began to seek employment-based permanent residence in the 
United States, also known as obtaining a “green card.”18 Margarito quali-
fied for a green card as a beneficiary of a labor certification application 
filed before April 30, 2001.19 Following the process laid out in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255, Margarito hired immigration attorney Tahir Mella to submit an 
ETA-750 Labor Certification Application on behalf of Margarito’s em-
ployer, Barrels Italian Foods and Restaurant.20 
 It took the Department of Labor five years to approve the labor cer-
tification application submitted by Mella.21 Mella then took the next 
step of filing a visa petition with the United States Custom and Immigra-
tion Service (USCIS).22 At this time, Mella was required to prove that 
Margarito’s employer could pay the agreed-upon wage.23 In November 
2007, the USCIS denied the visa petition because there was no showing 
                                                                                                                      
applications, to show they are eligible to stay in the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) 
(explaining that an alien may use “visa or other entry document[s], if any, and any other 
records and documents” in meeting the alien’s burden of proof that he or she “is lawfully 
present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission”). 
16 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585–87; Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 
106 (3d Cir. 2005). The court’s decision in Contreras limits earlier applications of due proc-
ess, where the court did not restrict when ineffective assistance may occur, only that it may 
be found when an alien is prevented from reasonably presenting his or her case. See Zheng, 
422 F.3d at 106. 
17 Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 2012). 
18 Id. 
19 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006) (permitting aliens who enter the United States 
without inspection and who are beneficiaries of an application for a labor certification to 
apply for a status adjustment of permanent residency). 
20 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) (2006); Contreras, 665 F.3d at 581; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). 
An adjustment to alien status pursuant to 8 U.S.C § 1255(i) requires (I) an alien and his 
sponsoring employer show via an ETA-750 labor certificate that there are insufficient workers 
of appropriate skill and qualifications in the area, and (II) that the alien’s admittance will not 
adversely affect the employment or wages of other like employed workers in the United 
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A). 
21 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 581. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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that the company could pay this wage.24 The USCIS gave Contreras 
thirty-three days to appeal.25 
 Mella met with Margarito in January 2008, well past the thirty-
three day appeal deadline.26 Mella offered to file a motion to reopen 
the visa petition and in exchange, Margarito paid him the requested 
one thousand dollars.27 Mella decided instead to file a motion to recon-
sider the USCIS’s initial visa denial, even though that deadline had also 
passed.28 Mella never told Margarito that the deadline had passed or 
that he could file a new Application for Employment Certification in-
stead.29 
 The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceed-
ings against the Contrerases in the spring of 2008 and the couple paid 
Mella another fifty-five hundred dollars for him to personally represent 
them at the removal hearing.30 Instead of appearing himself as prom-
ised, Mella sent several other attorneys from his office, who, according 
to the IJ, “‘might not [have been] fully aware of the immigration laws,’” 
evidenced, in part, by their ignorance of the meaning of a priority 
date.31 The attorneys sent to represent the Contrerases told the IJ that a 
timely appeal had been filed, even though that was not the case, and 
then, rather than asking for a continuance, requested voluntary depar-
ture for the Contrerases.32 The IJ continued the case to allow counsel 
time to more adequately prepare.33 A second hearing was held in April 
2008, during which Mella sent yet another attorney from his firm who 
requested only voluntary departure on behalf of the Contrerases.34 The 
IJ granted the request and gave the Contrerases time to voluntarily 
leave the United States.35 
 The day before their period of voluntary departure was to expire, 
the Contrerases filed a motion with the immigration court to reopen 
the case based on Mella’s previous ineffective assistance of counsel.36 
                                                                                                                      
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 581–82. 
26 Id. at 582. 
27 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 582. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.; In re Contreras, No. A088 194 669, 2010 WL 4213253, at *1 (B.I.A. 2010), aff’d 
sub nom. Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2012). 
30 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 582. 
31 Id. at 582 & n.1. 




36 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 582. 
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The Contrerases claimed that Mella’s assistance was ineffective both 
before and during the removal process.37 They contended that in filing 
the labor certification application prior to the removal proceeding, 
Mella disregarded the fact that Margarito’s employer could not pay the 
required wage.38 They further contended that Mella then failed to file a 
timely motion to reconsider the denied visa petition.39 Additionally, 
they argued that Mella and the attorneys sent on his behalf were inef-
fective during the hearing by misrepresenting the status of the appeal 
and by not requesting a continuance instead of voluntary departure.40 
 The IJ denied the appeal, explaining that she did not have juris-
diction over the Application for Employment Certification, and finding 
that Mella did not prejudice the Contrerases during the removal pro-
ceeding itself.41 First, the IJ found that Mella’s failure to request a con-
tinuance was not a failure to request relief.42 The IJ referred to the 
original record, where she stated that she was unwilling to grant the 
Contrerases a continuance without evidence of a timely appeal of the 
rejected visa petition.43 Thus, the IJ found that the Contrerases were 
not eligible for any relief aside from voluntary departure and that their 
motion did not show ineffective assistance of counsel during the course 
of the removal proceedings.44 
 The Contrerases appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.45 The BIA 
affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal, stating that in or-
der to reopen a claim the previous counsel’s negligence must be “so 
egregious that it rendered the hearing unfair.”46 Again, the BIA noted a 
lack of jurisdiction to address the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the earlier visa petition process.47 Regarding the hear-
ing mistakes, the BIA found that the IJ’s weighing of the Contrerases’ 
factual basis was not clearly erroneous and therefore, there was no re-
versible error.48 Ultimately, the BIA concluded that the Contrerases did 
                                                                                                                      
37 See id. at 583. 
38 Id. at 581, 583. 
39 Id. at 583. 
40 Id. 





46 Id. at *2, *3. (emphasis added). 
47 See In re Contreras, 2010 WL 4213253, at *2. 
48 Id. at *3 (pointing to the proposition that when there are multiple permissible views 
of the evidence, a fact finder’s choice is not clearly erroneous and is therefore not reversi-
ble) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985)). 
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not show that the hearing before the IJ was unfair “during the course of 
the removal proceedings . . . .”49 Following the BIA’s decision, the Con-
trerases appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.50 
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Deportation 
Proceedings Under the Fifth Amendment 
  To address the Contrerases’ claim that Mella’s mistakes warranted 
a reopening of their case, the Third Circuit considered right to counsel 
standards under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.51 Although a 
right to effective counsel is recognized in criminal cases under the 
Sixth Amendment, the Third Circuit previously held that such a right 
does not apply to civil cases, including immigration proceedings.52 Still, 
appellate courts have differentiated deportation proceedings from tra-
ditional civil cases due to their impact on the immigrant’s liberty.53 
Therefore, the Fifth Amendment right to due process has been found 
to apply to deportation proceedings.54 
A. Identifying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings 
 The Third Circuit, reflecting the decisions of most circuit courts, 
recognizes ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration removal 
proceedings as a violation of due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment.55 In 2007, in Fadiga v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit found 
that counsel at a hearing may be so incompetent as to create a “funda-
mentally unfair” proceeding, giving rise to a Fifth Amendment due 
                                                                                                                      
49 See id. 
50 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 583. 
51 Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 584 (3d Cir. 2012). 
52 Id.; Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 157 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting the 
Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil cases, including immigration proceedings); see 
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680, 706–07 (recognizing 
that the proper standard for attorneys under the Sixth Amendment is “reasonably effective 
assistance”). 
53 See, e.g., Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 n.23 (citing Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 
381 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rendell, J., dissenting), which distinguished deportation proceedings 
from civil cases based on the possible deprivation of an alien’s liberty). 
54 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584; see U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 
(applying the Fifth Amendment to deportation proceedings). 
55 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584; see, e.g., Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 162, 163 (recognizing that 
when counsel’s mistakes prejudice the client’s interest, it may violate due process); Zheng 
v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel during removal proceedings under the Fifth Amendment); see also Zeru v. Gonza-
les, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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process claim.56 Under Fadiga, appellees must show that counsel’s inef-
fective performance substantially prejudiced them and prevented them 
from reasonably presenting their case.57 
 To identify ineffective assistance of counsel, the Third Circuit in 
Fadiga adopted the “two-part, error-and-prejudice test” used in 2000 by 
the Second Circuit in Iavorski v. INS.58 First, the court asks if “‘compe-
tent counsel would have acted otherwise.’”59 If so, the court looks to 
whether counsel’s incompetent performance prejudiced the individ-
ual.60 Such prejudice is shown if it is reasonably likely that the removal 
proceedings would have resulted differently absent counsel’s errors.61 
Therefore, the test requires a showing that the original removal order is 
unfair because the IJ would not have entered such an order had there 
been effective representation.62 Prior to Contreras, the Third Circuit ap-
plied this test only to counsel’s ineffectiveness during removal proceed-
ings and had not discussed ineffectiveness occurring before such pro-
ceedings commenced.63 
 To address the Contrerases’ claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel before removal proceedings, the Third Circuit, lacking direct circuit 
precedent, turned to Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey.64 In 2008, in Balam-Chuc, 
the Ninth Circuit found that the mistakes at issue were made before the 
initiation of removal proceedings, and thus did not relate to the sub-
stance of the removal proceeding itself.65 Therefore, Balam-Chuc con-
strained the Fifth Amendment due process right to the proceeding it-
self and refused to recognize any due process rights for legal assistance 
outside of the actual removal hearing.66 To determine if due process 
was violated, the Third Circuit in Contreras applied the Balam-Chuc stan-
dard to assess the timing of Mella’s ineffectiveness.67 
                                                                                                                      
56 Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.; see Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2000). 
59 Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 (quoting Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 129). 
60 Id. (citing Zheng, 422 F.3d at 107). 
61 Id. at 160. 
62 Id. at 159. 
63 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585. 
64 Id. (applying the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1044 
(9th Cir. 2008), to the instant case). 
65 Id.; Balam-Chuc, 547 F.3d at 1051 (holding that “the Fifth Amendment simply does 
not apply to the preparation and filing of a petition that does not relate to the fundamen-
tal fairness of an ongoing proceeding”). 
66 See Balam-Chuc, 547 F.3d at 1051. 
67 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585–86; Balam-Chuc, 547 F.3d at 1051. 
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B. Third Circuit Finds a Fundamentally Fair Hearing 
 In their appeal to the Third Circuit, the Contrerases argued that 
their Fifth Amendment right to due process had been violated in two 
ways.68 First, the Contrerases argued that Mella’s mistakes of incorrectly 
filing and appealing visa petitions prior to the hearing jeopardized 
their application.69 Second, they claimed their counsel at the proceed-
ing was defective for misleading the IJ and failing to request a continu-
ance.70 The court considered each allegation independently.71 
1. Third Circuit Holds That Fundamental Fairness Is Unaffected by 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Prior to a Removal Hearing 
 The court first considered the Contrerases’ claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel prior to the removal hearing.72 The Contrerases 
argued that although Mella knew a labor certification would be denied 
because Margarito’s employer could not pay the required wage, he fu-
tilely filed a labor certification application with the Department of La-
bor.73 The Contrerases then claimed that Mella failed to timely file a 
motion to reconsider the visa petition once it was denied.74 The court 
reviewed both the decision of the IJ and the BIA, noting they would 
reopen the case only if the IJ had abused her discretion, or reverse the 
finding if the denial of the appeal was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.”75 
 The Third Circuit first applied the Fadiga standard, requiring that 
ineffective assistance of counsel must harm the fundamental fairness of 
the proceeding.76 Mella’s contested mistakes, however, were made dur-
ing the course of the filing of the visa application and not during the 
hearing or other parts of the removal proceedings.77 In fact, the court 
noted, the removal proceedings did not begin until after Mella’s “sub-
standard performance” occurred.78 Therefore, Mella’s deficient per-
formance had no impact on the fundamental fairness of the removal 
                                                                                                                      
68 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 583. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 583–84. 
72 Id. at 584. 
73 Id. at 583. 
74 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 583. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 584; see Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155. 
77 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585–86. 
78 Id. at 587. 
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proceedings.79 The Third Circuit found that the Contrerases were still 
able to present their case and available arguments to the IJ during the 
hearing, and thus were not prejudiced by Mella’s mistakes.80 
2. Mella’s Mistakes Did Not Cause Prejudice at Trial 
 In addition to their pre-proceeding ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the Contrerases argued that Mella and the other attorneys from 
his office provided defective assistance during the proceeding.81 Specifi-
cally, the Contrerases alleged that counsel mistakenly claimed that Mar-
garito’s denied visa petition had been timely appealed and also that 
counsel failed to request a continuance.82 The Contrerases contended 
that had their counsel requested a continuance, the additional time 
would have allowed Margarito’s employer to reapply for a visa on his 
behalf, or at the very least spared them the threat of a ten-year bar of 
admissibility.83 
 In addressing the appeal, the Third Circuit found that these mis-
takes had not prejudiced the Contrerases.84 Although the attorney who 
was sent by Mella to appear on the Contrerases’ behalf initially told the 
IJ that an appeal had been filed, she later admitted she was mistaken.85 
Thus, the Third Circuit found that the IJ was not misled to believe that 
there had been a timely appeal and the misstatement regarding the 
status of the appeal was not prejudicial.86 
 Additionally, the Third Circuit determined that counsel’s request 
for a continuance did not prejudice the Contrerases’ interest.87 The 
court pointed to the record that stated that without evidence of a timely 
appeal of the visa petition denial, the IJ would not have granted a con-
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. at 585–86. 
80 Id. at 586. The court found that “inept conduct prior to the removal proceedings . . . 
did not compromise the fundamental fairness of the removal proceedings themselves.” Id. 
at 585–86. 
81 Id. at 583. 
82 Id. 
83 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 583, 588; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2006) (stating 
that an alien who has departed or has been removed from the United States after being 
unlawfully present for a year or more is ineligible for re-admission to the United States 
within ten years of the alien’s removal). 
84 Contreras, 665 F.3d. at 587. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. The Third Circuit reasoned that “competent counsel would not have re-
quested a third continuance . . . because, based on the IJ’s previous comments, such a 
request would have been futile.” Id. 
88 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
tinuance.88 Because a timely appeal had not been filed, any request for 
a continuance would likely have been denied.89 The court reasoned 
that an IJ has wide discretion to grant requests, and concluded that she 
did not abuse this discretion by denying the continuance. 90 
 Finally, the court found that had counsel requested a continuance, 
it was unlikely that it would have protected the Contrerases from a ten-
year ban of admissibility.91 The IJ likely would not have granted a con-
tinuance, and therefore, the Contrerases would have been involuntary 
removed had their counsel not sought voluntary departure.92 Because 
the Contrerases had already lived in the United States illegally for over 
a year, they were still subject to the ten-year ban for voluntary or invol-
untary removal.93 In light of the above, the Third Circuit found that 
Mella’s mistakes did not prejudice the Contrerases because the result of 
the removal proceeding would likely have been the same regardless of 
counsel’s actions during the hearing itself.94 
III. When Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Prejudices Aliens: The 
Application of Due Process to Pre-Hearing Procedures 
 The heart of the Contrerases’ appeal was their claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel prior to the removal hearing.95 The Contrerases 
argued that Mella’s mistake prejudiced them at the removal proceed-
ing and thus violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process.96 
A. Using the Error-and-Prejudice Test to Determine Fundamental Fairness 
 To address the Contrerases’ claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel prior to the removal proceeding, the Third Circuit turned to the 
standard recognized in Fadiga v. Attorney General of the United States: to 
                                                                                                                      
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 587. IJs are not required to grant continuance requests if it is 
merely speculative that a visa application for the immigrants will be approved in the future. 
Id. 
91 Id. at 588; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2006). 
92 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 588. 
93 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II); Contreras, 665 F.3d at 588. 
94 See Contreras, 665 F.3d. at 585–88. 
95 See Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Contreras, 
No. A088 194 669, 2010 WL 4213253, at *2 (B.I.A. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Contreras v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that the Contrerases’ “arguments of inef-
fective assistance of counsel center on [Margarito’s] pursuit of his application for adjust-
ment of status by way of an employment-based visa petition”). 
96 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 583–84. 
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prejudice the immigrant’s interests, counsel’s ineffectiveness “must be 
so severe as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the removal 
proceedings.”97 The court in Contreras v. Attorney General of the United 
States acknowledged that the traditional two-part error-and-prejudice 
test is applied to determine whether counsel’s mistakes prevented the 
alien from presenting his or her case, yet declined to apply it.98 
 Instead of the error-and-prejudice test, the Third Circuit adopted 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Balam Chuc v. Mukasey, that due process 
is not violated if the visa petition filing is unrelated to the ongoing re-
moval proceeding.99 Applying this standard to the Contrerases, the 
court found that the fundamental fairness of the removal proceeding 
was not harmed because the proceeding began after Mella’s filing mis-
takes.100 The court acknowledged that Mella’s handling of the Con-
trerases’ visa petition “fell well short of the decency and professional-
ism” expected from an immigration attorney.101 Nevertheless, the court 
found that the Contrerases were still able to present arguments at their 
hearing; there were just no helpful arguments or evidence available to 
them.102 
 By finding that due process did not apply to Mella’s pre-proceeding 
mistakes, the Third Circuit restricted the due process typically afforded 
to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.103 By not applying the error-
and-prejudice test to pre-proceedings mistakes, the Contreras court over-
looked that these mistakes compromised the fairness of the hearing it-
self.104 
                                                                                                                      
97 Id. at 584; Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007). 
98 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584–85 (addressing the error-and-prejudice test but declin-
ing to apply it to the instant case after reaching the conclusion that the Fifth Amendment 
does not protect pre-proceeding ineffective assistance of counsel). The error-and-
prejudice test was first developed in Strickland v. Washington to determine ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in criminal cases. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984). 
The Ninth Circuit applied the test to removal proceedings in Maravilla Maravilla v. 
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2004), and the Third Circuit applied the test for 
the same purpose in Fadiga v. Attorney General of United States, 488 F.3d 142, 155, 157 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
99 Id. at 585; Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1044, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2008). 
100 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585–87. 
101 Id. at 587. 
102 Id. at 586. 
103 See id. at 585–86; Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 152, 163 (finding counsel’s failure to review asy-
lum petition prior to filing did not produce a fundamentally fair hearing, thus denying the 
alien due process). 
104 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 586. Courts of appeals, including the Third Circuit, have 
overturned cases that incorrectly use the error-and-prejudice test standard because they 
failed to properly analyze the fundamental fairness of a hearing. See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 161 
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  Had the court followed the well-established error-and-prejudice 
test, it would likely have found that Mella’s mistakes substantially preju-
diced the Contrerases.105 First, the test asks, “whether ‘competent coun-
sel would have acted otherwise.’”106 Here, the Third Circuit admitted 
that Mella went on a “fool’s errand,” called his conduct “inept” and 
“well short of the decency and professionalism [the court] expect[s] 
from the immigration bar.”107 Therefore, it was clear that the court felt 
competent counsel should have, and would have, acted otherwise.108 
 Second, the error-and-prejudice test asks, “whether counsel’s poor 
performance prejudiced the alien.”109 Prejudice is revealed if the alien 
can show that he was prevented from “reasonably presenting his case” 
and that there is a “‘reasonable likelihood’” that his proceeding would 
have resulted differently absent counsel’s mistakes.110 While the Third 
Circuit pointed out that the Contrerases did not have any arguments or 
evidence that would have provided relief at the hearing, it acknowl-
edged that absent Mella’s mistakes the IJ may have continued the re-
moval proceeding.111 Accordingly, the Contrerases were prejudiced by 
counsel’s poor performance because there may have been a different 
result had Mella acted otherwise.112 
 Under the error-and-prejudice test, Mella’s pre-proceeding mis-
takes show substantial prejudice.113 By ignoring this test and consider-
                                                                                                                      
(requiring that the court ask if there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of a 
hearing would be different without counsel’s mistakes); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 128–
29 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding a hearing is unfair if competent counsel would act differently 
and the alien is harmed by counsel’s mistakes). 
105 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584–85; Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 162 (applying the error-and-
prejudice test to show that counsel’s performance fell below the “objective standard” and 
“severely compromised” the alien’s ability to present arguments). 
106 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584 (quoting Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 128–29). 
107 Id. at 585–87. 
108 See id. 
109 Id. at 584. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 585–86. 
112 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585–86; Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 154–55 (finding counsel’s poor 
performance prejudiced the alien because there was a reasonable likelihood that the alien 
would have won at his hearing absent counsel’s mistakes). 
113 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585; Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 154–55 (finding prejudice when 
counsel’s performance fell below the reasonable standard, creating the reasonable likeli-
hood that the appeal would have resulted differently absent counsel’s mistakes); see also 
Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 883 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that counsel’s failure to file an appeal 
was below the standard of competency and pointing to the likelihood that the alien would 
have prevailed otherwise). 
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ing simply when the ineffective assistance occurred, the court limited 
the application of due process to the actual legal proceedings.114 
B. Failure to Recognize Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Pre-Proceeding 
Assistance Limits Due Process in Removal Proceedings 
 The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process, which in removal 
proceedings means aliens are entitled to the process of a fundamentally 
fair hearing.115 Yet, removal proceedings are closely linked to pre-
proceeding applications because such applications are routinely used as 
evidence, arguments, and defenses in removal hearings.116 In fact, a re-
moval hearing focuses on an alien’s legal status, a status dependent on 
existing visa petitions, green cards, and other adjustments of status.117 
Thus, when counsel makes mistakes on visa petitions, potential argu-
ments change or disappear.118 The result of counsel’s incompetence be-
fore the hearing, like the result for the Contrerases, can be devastating 
at the hearing itself.119 
 By finding that Fifth Amendment due process does not apply to 
ineffective pre-hearing assistance, the Third Circuit limited due process 
previously available to aliens.120 Here, the court admits that the Con-
trerases deserved better than Mella’s representation, yet it eliminates 
any remedy by failing to apply the due process standard to pre-
                                                                                                                      
114 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585–86. The Third Circuit previously held that ineffective 
assistance of counsel denies due process when the alien is prevented from reasonably pre-
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118 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585; see also Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 148, 162 (finding that coun-
sel’s failure to review the application before the hearing or to tell his client about the po-
tential for witnesses to testify at the hearing restricted the alien’s arguments and dimin-
ished his credibility at the hearing). 
119 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 586; Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 148, 162. 
120 U.S. Const. amend. V. Compare Contreras, 665 F.3d at 586 (recognizing counsel’s 
substandard performance yet denying a remedy because it occurred too early), with Zheng, 
422 F.3d at 107 (requiring that an alien only demonstrate that counsel’s assistance was 
ineffective and that the alien was prejudiced by counsel’s actions). 
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proceeding assistance.121 Without a right to effective counsel prior to 
the hearing itself, aliens have no due process remedy when immigra-
tion attorneys make careless or dishonest mistakes that harm their re-
moval proceedings.122 The majority’s opinion will lead to deportation 
and bars of admissibility for aliens with legitimate visa petitions, but 
who receive ineffective assistance of counsel prior to their hearings.123 
Conclusion 
 The Third Circuit correctly identified that aliens have a due proc-
ess right under the Fifth Amendment in removal proceedings. This due 
process right may be violated when ineffective assistance of immigra-
tion counsel reduces the possibility of achieving a “fundamentally fair 
hearing.” The Contrerases argued that their attorney’s mistakes during 
the filing of their visa petition and during the removal hearing violated 
their due process right to a fundamentally fair hearing. The Third Cir-
cuit, however, differentiated between effective assistance of counsel at 
the removal hearing itself and the assistance in pre-proceeding immi-
gration petitions and held that Fifth Amendment due process does not 
apply to ineffective pre-hearing assistance. In the current immigration 
system, pre-proceeding assistance from an immigration attorney is vital 
to the development and presentation of arguments and defenses in a 
removal hearing. Accordingly, the Third Circuit’s decision decreases 
the due process rights available to undocumented aliens, particularly 
those simultaneously defending removal proceedings and applying for 
adjustment of status. 
                                                                                                                      
121 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 587; Balam-Chuc, 547 F.3d at 1050. 
122 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 587; Balam-Chuc, 547 F.3d at 1050. 
123 See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 586, 587; see also Balam-Chuc, 547 F.3d at 1051 (recognizing 
that limiting due process to existing removal proceedings meant the alien and his family 
would be deported because his attorney failed to file a timely visa application). 
